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been passed. It ensures, among other
things, that activities are conducted in
accordance with those regulations. Bank
supervision also involves assessing risk-
management practices, helping boards
and management make informed deci-
sions, and, most recently, spreading best
practices of the industry.
While the distinction between regulation
and supervision may not always be clear,
what is clear is that the system is chang-
ing. Regulatory and supervisory agen-
cies have begun and will continue to rely
more heavily on supervision, and less on
regulation, to ensure the safety and
soundness of our financial system.
■ What Are Regulation and
Supervision Supposed to
Accomplish?
Academics sometimes ask whether there
is any legitimate purpose behind bank-
ing regulation and supervision. That may
seem an abstract question, but even peo-
ple who prefer a more Hayekian market
economy—without even such regula-
tions as legal tender laws—must agree
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international competition, and new
legislation are changing the face of
the financial services industry. How
are the agencies responsible for
ensuring the safety and soundness of
our financial system responding?
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W hen I was still in graduate school,
more than 35 years ago, it would have
been hard to persuade me that I would
be approaching the end of my career
before we started to think seriously
about the post-Glass-Steagall banking
environment. By the mid-1980s, when I
worked for a commercial bank on the
West Coast, I had become sufficiently
discouraged by the slow pace of banking
reform that I thought I was making a
joke when I would say, “The Berlin Wall
will probably come down before Glass-
Steagall!” Gramm-Leach-Bliley was
signed on November 12, 1999.  I had
been hoping it would be signed three
days earlier on November 9, which
would have made it exactly on the tenth
anniversary of the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall!  
Bankers are no doubt still assessing the
opportunities and strategic implications
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the imple-
menting regulations.  At the same time,
they are still digesting the impact of 
the Internet and wireless technology, 
ongoing bank mergers, and new 
financial products. 
Banking regulators and supervisors, for
our part, are pondering the implications 
as well. We know the system of supervi-
sion and regulation must be modernized
to keep pace with a dynamic financial 
services industry.
To begin to do that, we need to address
two basic questions. First, what public
purpose do supervision and regulation
ultimately serve?  Second, apart from leg-
islation, what forces are driving change in
the financial services industry? We must
answer these questions to anticipate how
the system of supervision and regulation
must change, so that these activities can
accomplish their public purpose within
the new financial landscape.
■ Supervision and Regulation
Are Different
Before we try to answer those questions,
it is important to distinguish between
supervision and regulation. These two
words are often used interchangeably, or
in conjunction with one another, to imply
that both relate to the same concept or
process. That can’t be further from the
truth.  And, while we’re distinguishing
between the two, it might also be helpful
to reverse the order and refer to these
concepts as “regulation and supervision,”
since, as a practical matter, one typically
follows the other.
Regulation refers to the rules or proce-
dures that are designed to govern an
industry’s behavior. It is the prescriptions
or boundaries imposed on the industry by
legislators and regulatory bodies in an
effort to “direct” it.
Regulation takes place in a political 
context—democracies often use legisla-
tion to encourage the things society as a
whole likes (such as economic develop-
ment) and discourage the things it doesn’t
(thus, the sin tax). As globalization and
technology advance, financial institutions
become an easy target for additional 
regulation; new regulations might be seen
as a way of thwarting money laundering,
achieving community development goals,
or channeling credit to needy borrowers,
for example. Such uses are often a temp-
tation that leads regulation away from 
its true mission—to help establish the
boundaries within which an industry 
can operate.  
Supervision, on the other hand, is the
monitoring or oversight function that
takes place after the regulations havethat we certainly don’t have such a sys-
tem now. There are a number of roles
society has determined it wants an offi-
cial, governmental institution to perform.
These include traditional central banking
functions, such as providing a standard
of value and ensuring an effective pay-
ments system, as well as providing a
safety net under the operations of 
depository institutions.
Assigning these functions to a govern-
mental agency has two related conse-
quences that are important here.  The
first is that these activities can easily end
up hiding subsidies that distort markets.
It may be possible to create a fairly
priced deposit insurance program or to
properly apportion the costs of providing
an efficient payments system, but it is
nontrivial in the best of times, even with-
out political interference.  So the pricing
and distribution of governmental func-
tions can act as a distortion.  But some-
thing else happens once the government
takes responsibility for the program:
moral hazard.  The mere fact that we
have a central bank that serves as a
lender of last resort and a guarantor of
large-value, real-time payments, and the
FDIC providing deposit insurance, cre-
ates moral hazard.
Incentives are misaligned.  The price of
risk taking becomes too cheap.  This cre-
ates the need to rebalance the incentives,
and that is the mission of regulation and
supervision.  As Alan Greenspan put it
recently, “public policy should attempt to
simulate, in so far as possible, what mar-
kets alone might do, or at least to create
market-style incentives.”1
By implication, then, supervision is not
meant to replace the judgment of a
bank’s management or substitute for its
board of directors.  The goal is not to
make supervisors responsible for the
safety and soundness of banks.  It is to
return that responsibility to the banks and
enable them to shoulder it:  to get the
invisible hand back in the game, so to
speak.  In this environment, the role of
bank supervisors would at least be mini-
mized.  Given the presence of the federal
safety net, supervisors would remain in
the picture to provide general oversight
of the banking industry; to ensure that
risk-management systems are in place
and effective; and, where possible, to
share their experiences in supervising a
broad range of entities to communicate
what has generally worked well, and
what has generally not worked well. 
So while we have no choice but to
acknowledge that these distortions exist,
we need to ensure that the product of
these distortions (that is, bank supervi-
sors) add value to the environment in
which they’ve been inserted without
mistakenly assuming responsibility for
the safety and soundness of the industry.
Further, to fully understand the proper
role of supervision, it is necessary to
understand the nature of risk. Risk is like
total matter and energy in the 
universe—it can be transferred and 
transformed, but it cannot be destroyed.
Because risk can’t be eliminated, it must
be managed, and the business of banks
and other financial intermediaries is to
take on and manage risk.  
But in the presence of distortions, banks
do not take on the socially correct
amount of risk.  Such distortions end up
creating the very problems they were
designed to solve.  With deposit insur-
ance protecting them from the discipline
of the debt market, savings and loan
associations had the incentive in the
1980s to “go for broke.” And, of course,
many of them did just that—go broke—
and they took a lot of taxpayers’money
with them!  The purpose of regulation
and supervision is to see that the private
costs and benefits of taking and manag-
ing risk don’t deviate too far from the
social costs and benefits. This is also the
sole reason we have capital require-
ments—to prevent excessive leverage
and the risk that would accompany it. 
■ The Changing Financial
Landscape
What forces are changing the financial
industry?  Most of the pressure creating
the new financial landscape, of course,
comes from technological advances and
financial institutions themselves. Under-
lying trends in technology and finance
were creating opportunities for financial
institutions to innovate even before legis-
lation and regulation formally recognized
them.  Insurance, investment and mer-
chant banking, real estate brokerage, or
even joint ventures with telecommunica-
tions firms have been interesting
prospects for traditional bankers. The
movement toward electronically initiated
debits and credits certainly will continue,
though whether the successor to the ATM
will be a smart card, an Internet connec-
tion, or a wireless phone remains to be
seen. This means we need new solutions
to old problems—the successor to the
guy riding shotgun on the Wells Fargo
Stagecoach is now the biometrics expert
or the encryption specialist. 
Technology has also affected asset man-
agement.  Banks have the ability to alter
their balance sheets quickly as they buy,
sell, and trade financial assets. The
advent of round-the-world, round-the-
clock markets in stocks, bonds, futures,
and options makes it possible to alter a
balance sheet in the blink of an eye.  
It also means the ability to create,
package, and distribute new financial
products; so we see securitized loans,
collateralized loan obligations, and
credit derivatives. This enables banks
to add value to their customers—to
more finely craft products that have the
risk and liquidity characteristics that
lenders and borrowers want. It also
allows banks to manage their portfolios
more closely, laying off risk they
choose not to hold and concentrating
on the risks they have a comparative
advantage in bearing.
This ability to manage risk more finely
has the benefit of lowering the marginal
cost of bearing risk. As a simple exam-
ple, consider mortgage securitization—
banks were able to diversify away their
default risk on home mortgages by trad-
ing individual mortgages for collateral-
ized mortgage obligations (CMOs) But
the many CMO constructs also mean
that investors can make some very com-
plex and risky bets in the mortgage
market. So an increased ability to man-
age risk is a two-edged sword: Mort-
gage holders can reduce their default
risk, but with misaligned incentives—
without supervision—it is now easier to
take on too much risk.
Market consolidation is also a potent
force changing the industry. Among
banking companies, we see growing
size, concentration, and complexity.
Banks now spread across vast regions of
the country (or around the world),
engaging in wholesale, retail, and sub-
prime lending, Internet banking, and
trust services, funded by a broad array
of deposit and nondeposit liabilities.
And this is just “traditional” banking.  
The financial holding company allows
new combinations of financial services:
banking and insurance, investment and
commercial banking, mortgage banking,
trusts, and annuities. Even the lines
between banking and commerce blur.  Lastly, international competition pro-
vides an extra impetus for change—
for large financial firms and bank
supervisory agencies.
■ Less Regulation and a New
Approach to Supervision
Gramm-Leach-Bliley was only one
response to the changing marketplace.
Recognizing that financial institutions
have “gamed the system” to a certain
extent and found ways around the once-
relevant barriers erected in the 1930s,
legislators finally removed many of
these barriers to allow the financial
industry to determine its own efficient
topography within more general bound-
aries. Akey element in eliminating these
barriers is the movement in supervision
away from a system of permission and
denial toward a system of certification
and notification. In the past, banks filed
applications whenever they wanted to
do something new, and the bank super-
visor either approved or denied those
applications. Now, once a financial
holding company qualifies and contin-
ues to meet the qualifying criteria, they
expand and tell the Fed afterward. The
burden has shifted from banks proving
themselves “worthy,” to the supervisor
intervening if risk-management systems
appear inadequate.  
Recognizing that financial services
firms would increasingly be able to stay
several jumps ahead of any command-
and-control, permission-and-denial 
system, supervisory authorities know
that a different approach is needed: To
keep up with the marketplace, supervi-
sors need flexibility. This awareness is
reflected in the proposals for a revised
Basel Capital Accord. While the revi-
sions retain a revised “standardized
approach” that updates the risk-buckets
framework from the original 1988
accord, the heart of the proposal is the
new internal ratings-based approach
(IRB). This approach is meant to give
banks the incentive to hold the appropri-
ate amount of capital for the risk they
actually bear.  Regulations will no
longer determine the correct amount of
capital; rather, the appropriate level will
be based upon the institution’s internal
risk ratings.  
Although the IRB has generated the most
discussion, the Basel proposal rests on
what the Bank for International 
Settlements calls three pillars, which also
represent a new approach to supervision.
The first is the new minimum capital
requirement, which, as I just noted, is
preferably based on the bank’s own inter-
nal risk-management system.  
The second is the supervisory review
process. Bank supervisors will evaluate
the bank’s own procedures for assigning
risk ratings and, consequently, for decid-
ing on the appropriate level of capitaliza-
tion. Essentially, bank supervisors will
be saying two things to bankers: Be 
sure you understand your risk, and be
sure you are maintaining enough capital
to protect yourself from that risk. 
In this setting, supervisors can only add
value through the review and validation
of risk-management systems. We have
an inkling of the future in the ways in
which supervision has changed recently
and in new programs that have tried to
implement the new approach, such as
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land’s “value-added supervision.” This
approach means that we want supervi-
sors to view themselves more as agents
who spread the best practices of finan-
cial and management systems, rather
than financial cops. It means, in many
cases, simply asking the right ques-
tions: What are your greatest expo-
sures? Are you prepared for the finan-
cial equivalent of a hundred-year flood?
What makes you so sure? How do you
know you don’t have your own version
of Nick Leeson? Done properly, this
encourages responsible behavior and
aims at preventing the concentration of
risks that leads to problems.  And pre-
vention is a keystone of the proposed
new accord.
The third pillar is market discipline.
Market discipline is essential, as it
exerts pressures on management and
shareholders to align risks with
rewards. Of course, this third pillar is
not well developed, and we do not yet
have effective market discipline within
the environment of misaligned incen-
tives created by the safety net.
Although it will never become a fully
reliable substitute for the supervisory
review process, it will be a source of
independent information, and fuller 
disclosure should make markets more
reliable as the outer rampart of a safe
and sound financial system.
■ Challenges for Bank 
Supervisors and the 
Supervisory Process    
Continued movement away from a 
permission-and-denial approach to one in
which the risk-management system of
the bank is assessed requires a closer
focus on the incentives in the organiza-
tion. That means a shift from detailed
transactions testing and loan file review
toward more review and validation of the
systems an institution uses to identify and
manage its risk.  
Not so long ago, getting a snapshot of 
a bank’s portfolio of loans and invest-
ments as well as its sources of funding
might have given an examiner a good
idea of how the bank was managed.
Now, altering the composition of both
the asset and liability sides of the balance
sheet is so easy that such snapshots serve
little purpose. In fact, even getting an
unblurred snapshot at a point in time
becomes increasing difficult, as both
financial institutions and financial con-
tracts grow in complexity.
Undoubtedly, the increasing fluidity of
the financial industry has fundamental
implications for bank supervisors and
the skills required to be effective and to
add value. The skills needed to deter-
mine whether a loan has proper docu-
mentation are not the same as those
needed to assess the organizational
architecture of the bank. Understanding
how risk is managed at the firm and
identifying which executives have the
right to make key decisions—those who
choose the risks that are taken, determine
what the key performance measures are,
and decide what the reward system is—
are not trivial tasks and definitely require
new, specialized skill sets to accomplish.
When you consider the fact that supervi-
sors must also evaluate a firm’s opera-
tional soundness and how this task has
been complicated by technology, you
realize the entire process is quite daunt-
ing. Add in the need to evaluate the
effectiveness of market discipline and
the need to rely on reports from different
functional regulators, such as the SEC 
or insurance commissioners, and the
challenge becomes greater still. In 
addition, different-sized organizations
may have very different needs. The 
market discipline imposed by a small
group of local stockholders may be no
less effective than that imposed by 
specialists on the New York Stock
Exchange or institutional investors, 
but supervisors must use different
approaches when evaluating each form
of market discipline.  
Flexibility and adaptability are critical.
Supervisors may well have a role in
spreading best practices from large firms
to small ones, or vice versa. But in theend, the real test of bank supervisors is
the amount of value added or, put quite
simply, whether the bank was stronger
when the supervisors left than when 
they arrived.
■ Conclusion
What else is in store for bankers and
bank supervisors? An old adage says,
“Nothing is constant but change,” and
that is certainly the case for the financial
services industry. But there is a major
difference in the way change was once
viewed: Rather than the change being
“done to” the financial services industry,
the financial services industry is in a
position to “do the changing.”  
Bankers are the ones who are dictating
the change and shaping the landscape of
the financial services industry. As a
result, the system of supervision and 
regulation has to adapt, and has, in fact,
been adapting. We are rapidly moving to
an environment that relies less on  rigid
adherence to regulations and more on
supervision that is flexible enough to let
the industry grow as the industry sees fit,
yet strategically involved to maintain the
system’s safety and soundness. This new
environment has been made more flexi-
ble as supervisory agencies have been
given the latitude of interpretation to
determine which activities are “financial
in nature” or “complementary” in order
to keep the powers of financial holding
companies up to date.2
If we do our job well, future changes
will be evolutionary, with less need for
periodic “omnibus banking bills” such
as Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
■ Footnotes
1. Alan Greenspan, “The Financial Safety
Net,” remarks to the 37th annual Conference
on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 10, 2001.
2.The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act granted joint
powers to the Treasury Department and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to expand the list of permissible 
activities for financial holding companies and
financial subsidiaries of banks deemed 
“financial in nature.” In addition, powers were
granted to the Board of Governors alone to
deem new activities “complementary” and
therefore permissible for financial holding
companies. See section 103 of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act adding sections 4(k)(1)(B)
and 4(k)(2) to the Bank Holding Company Act.
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